

**Title:** A Practical Public Goods Mechanism for Policing\*

**Presenter:** Jordan Adamson (Leipzig University, Germany)

**Abstract:** How can a government that is neither omniscient nor omnipotent effectively police the population? We propose a modified Groves-Ledyard (1977) mechanism that estimates the demand for a public good and measures how demand changes with different policies. We experimentally test our mechanism in a virtual Phase-0 trial with known utility functions over generic commodities. This mirrors existing experiments and we find our mechanism performs extraordinarily well. We then test our mechanism in an unprecedented Phase-1 experiment where participants choose the quantity of police officers based on the original mechanism (optimal in theory) or our modified mechanism (optimal in expectation). Preliminary results suggest our mechanism accurately measures police performance in terms of subjective benefits. As such, our mechanism improves upon existing approaches to choose police levels and policies.